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ARE SOME POLLUTERS MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS?
A CRITIQUE OF CASELAW ESTABLISHING
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF FEDERAL
POTENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE PARTIES (PRPS) UNDER
CERCLA
Dianne K. LeVerrier'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 2 is, to put it simply,
a tough statute. By its terms, the arm of the statute is long,
subjecting a wide range of parties associated with hazardous waste
to liability including: owners and operators,4 those who owned or
operated the facility at the time of the discharge, 5 arrangers,
6
transporters, 7 generators 8 and successors.9  These parties are
commonly known as potentially responsible parties ("PRPs").
Ms. Leverrier is a senior staff member of the Touro Law Review and
raduates in May 2001.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1980) amended by H.R. REP. No. 99-253(l) at 74
(1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835 (The Superfund Amendments
Reauthorization Act of 1986, extended in October, 1990, to September 30, 1994
[hereinafter SARA]).
3 CERCLA liability is not limited to the following parties while forward-
thinking litigators attempt to create new categories of liable parties in an effort
to reduce their client's share of liability. See, e.g., Commander Oil Corp. v.
Barlo Equipment Corp., 215 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 2000) cert. denied __ U.S. __
121 S. Ct. 427, 138 L. Ed. 2d 436 (2000) (here the litigator unsuccessfully
argued that a sublessee should be considered an owner for the purpose of
CERCLA Section 107).
4 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (1). See also United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51
(1998) (holding that a corporate parent which actually participates in and
exercises control over the operations of its subsidiary's facility may be held
directly liable as an "operator" under CERCLA); see also B.F. Goodrich v.
Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 514 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that corporate parents and
individual officers may be held liable as "operators" under Section 107), cert
denied sub nom, Zollo Drum Co. v. B.F. Goodrich, 524 U.S. 926 (1998).
' 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (2).
6 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (3). See also Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d
160, 164 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers
Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (1 1th Cir. 1990) "whether arrangement for disposal
exists depends on the facts of each case.").
7 42 U.S.C.§ 9607 (a) (4). See also United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811,
820 (3d Cir. 1995) (determining that transporter liability "is established by
503
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Following CERCLA's enactment in 1980, the judiciary
empowered the statute by interpreting liability to be strict, joint
and several. 10 The courts reasoned that a harsh liability scheme
was essential to effectuate the policy of the statute; remediate
hazardous waste sites expeditiously, and make polluters pay."
Recently, the circuit courts amplified CERCLA's harsh
scheme by preventing PRPs, even those who voluntarily remediate
hazardous waste sites, from recovering the entire costs of
remediation from joint and severally liable defendants in a Section
107 cost-recovery action.12  A Section 107 cost-recovery action
showing that a person accepted hazardous substances for transport, and either
selected the disposal facility or had substantial input into deciding where
hazardous substances should be disposed.").
8 Although generators are not specifically mentioned in the statute, they fall
within the parameters of 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (3). This section subjects to
liability "[a]ny person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport, for diposal or
treatment of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by
any other party or entity, and containing such hazardous substances...."
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (21) (defining "person" as "a corporation, association,
partnership, consortium, joint venture [or] commercial entity"); see also
Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 518 (holding that CERCLA's definition of "persons"
includes "successor corporations").
'o See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (32); see also Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 514 (stating that
"[t]he Act imposes strict liability [which] is intended to make sure that those
who benefit financially from a commercial activity internalize the environmental
costs of the activity as a cost of doing business."); New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (explaining that "[s]ection 9601 (32)
provides that 'liability' under CERCLA 'shall be construed to be the standard of
liability' under section 311 of the Clean Water Act ... which courts have held to
be strict liability").
11 See infra note 16. See also Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equipment Corp.,
215 F.3d 321, 327 (2d Cir. 2000) quoting B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 958 F.2d at
1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Because it is a remedial statute, CERCLA must be
construed liberally to effectuate its two primary goals: (1) enabling the EPA to
respond efficiently and expeditiously to toxic spills, and (2) holding those
parties [potentially] responsible for the releases liable for the costs of the
cleanup").
12 But see United Technologies v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 99 n.8
(1st Cir. 1994) (suggesting that "a PRP who initiates a clean-up without
government prodding" might be permitted to bring a Section 107 cost recovery
action) cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183 (1995). A signifcant part of CERCLA's
interpretive history involved serious debate regarding whether Section 107
504 [Vol 17
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imposes strict,' 3 joint and several 14 liability on PRPs for costs
associated with hazardous waste clean-up and site remediation.
Nearly all of the circuits have held that private PRPs are limited to
Section 11315 contribution actions. 16  Under Section 113, the
permitted private parties, who incurred remediation costs, to recover obtain full
cost recovery from jointly and severally liable defendants. Those courts which
permitted private parties proceed under Section 107, interpreted the section to
provide such a right of action see Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S.
809 (1994). Key Tronic provided: "although § 107 unquestionably provides a
cause of action for private parties to seek recovery of cleanup costs, that cause
of action is not explicitly set out in the text of the statute." Id. at 818-819. This
language was strangely uninfluential to the circuit courts in subsequent
decisions.
13 See New Castle County v. Haliburton NUS Corp., 11 F.3d 1116, 1120-21
(3d Cir. 1997) (stating that "[a] section 107 cost recovery action imposes strict
liability on potentially responsible persons for costs associated with hazardous
waste clean-up and site remediation"); United States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R.
Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995) ("it is now well settled that § 107
imposes strict liability on PRPs"); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964
F.2d 252, 259 (3d Cir. 1992) (reiterating the fact that "CERCLA imposes strict
liability on responsible parties."); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-253(1) at 74 (1985),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856 ("liability under CERCLA is strict,
that is, without regard to fault or willfullness").
14 See Colorado & Eastern R.R. Co., 50 F.3d at 1535 ("It is also well settled that
§ 107 imposes joint and several liability on PRPs regardless of fault"); United
Technologies, 33 F.3d at 100 (recognizing "presumed existence of joint and
several liability"); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1280-81 (3d
Cir. 1993).
5 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (f) (1994).
16 See Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining
that their "decision today to limit the recovery of a potentially responsible
person to contribution under § 113 (0 not only is in keeping with the holding of
other circuits... but also gives CERCLA its full intended effect."); Pneumo
Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d 769, 776
(4th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 525 U.S. 963 (1998); Centerior Service Co. v.
Acme Scrap Iron and Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 356 (6tb Cir. 1998) (finding
that "parties who themselves are PRPs ... are limited to actions for contribution
governed by the mechanisms set forth in CERCLA § 113, (f)."); New Castle
County, 111 F.3d at 1121 (3d Cir. 1997); Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont
Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1997) cert. denied 524 U.S. 937
(1998); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1513-
1514 (11th Cir. 1996); Colorado & Eastern R.R. Co., 50 F.3d at 1536; United
Technologies, 33 F.3d at 103; Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761,
764 (7th Cir. 1994).
2001
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plaintiffs own liability for contamination is considered
simultaneously with that of the severally liable defendants and
serves as an offset thereto.'
7
Despite the virtual unanimity amongst the circuits
regarding private PRPs, limiting them to Section 113 actions, most
courts which have addressed the issue have created exceptions for
federal PRPs; permitting them to obtain full cost recovery under
Section 107, regardless of their PRP status.1 8  These decisions
create a distinction between private and federal PRPs, which is not
evident in the statute.
This article will address the merits of this distinction by
first reviewing CERCLA's enactment and interpretive history.
Next, it will discuss the procedural and substantive differences
between a Section 107 indemnification action and a Section 113
contribution action. Next, it will review the reasoning applied by
the majority of circuit courts which limited private PRPs to Section
113 contribution actions. Finally, the article will critique the
16 United Technologies, 33 F.3d at 103
The word 'contribution' for the purpose of 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f) should be given its plain meaning. Adapted to an
environmental case, it refers to an action by a responsible
party to recover from another responsible party that portion of
its costs that are in excess of its pro rata share of the aggregate
response costs...
Id.
18 See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
(permitting the United States government an alleged arranger to proceed under
Section 107) Town of Wallkill v. Tesa Tape, 891 F. Supp. 955, 959 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (distinguishing a first circuit decision limiting private PRPs to Section
113 contribution action because "neither a town nor other governmental entity
was involved"); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 414 (D.N.J. 1991)
(holding that the federal government as an alleged PRP "is therefore entitled to
full recovery of clean-up costs whatever its potential liability for contribution");
United States v. Western Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. 930, 939-40 (W.D.
Wash. 1990) (holding that although the United States was a former site operator,
it may proceed with a Section 107 cost-recovery action). Although this article
refers to the distinction between federal and private PRPs, it should be noted that
state and local governmental PRPs have been treated the same as the latter.
[Vol 17
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district courts' rationale for distinguishing between federal and
private PRPs concluding that this distinction has no basis in the
statute, common law, or public policy.
II. CERCLA's ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY
CERCLA,19 commonly known as "Superfund, ' ' 20 was
hastily enacted on December 11, 1980.21 The Act is referred to as
the Superfund because it enabled the creation of the Hazardous
Waste Superfund; a monetary fund generated by taxing chemical
and petroleum industries, and used by governmental entities to
respond promptly to releases or threatened releases of hazardous
substances that may endanger public health or the environment.22
CERCLA's enactment also enabled the revision of the
National Contingency Plan (NCP). This plan established
guidelines and procedures for responding to releases and
threatened releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or
'9 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1980) amended by H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I) at
74 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835 (The Superfund Amendments
Reauthorization Act of 1986 extended in October, 1990, to September 30, 1994
thereinafter SARA]).
o See 26 U.S.C. § 9507. (The super "fund" is established by Section 9507 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986). The super "fund" is generated by taxing crude
oil received at a United States refinery, and petroleum products which enter the
United States for consumption. See 26 U.S.C. § 4611 (a) (1) & (2). The "fund"
may be used to pay for: response costs for cleaning up abandoned or
uncontrolled hazardous waste sites, grants for technical assistance, removal and
decontamination of lead-contaminated soil, restoration of injured natural
resources, and research. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611.
21 For a complete discussion of CERCLA's hasty enactment by a lame-duck
Congress see Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of
1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (1982) (discussing CERCLA's hasty
enactment), Public Lands, Toxic Chemicals Dominate 96 ih Congress, 2d
Session, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,231, 10,232 (1980) (discussing
CERCLA's ambiguities resulting from its hasty enactment).
22 See supra note 20. See also EPA 540-K-96/004 Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response, EPA Superfund Today, Focus on Cleanup Costs (June
1996) ("78% of the Superfund Trust Fund has come from chemical, petroleum,
and corporate taxes.").
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contaminants. 23 The plan is implemented at hazardous waste sites
throughout the country. Sites which have a high level of priority
are listed on the National Priorities List ("NPL"), established by
the NCP.24 The Act was amended in 1986 by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"). 25  In October
1990, SARA was extended to 1994.26 An appropriation by
Congress for Fiscal Year 1995 authorized Superfund to continue to
operate.27 The Act's purpose is to provide for liability,
compensation, cleanup and emergency response for the clean-up of
hazardous waste.28
Despite its success in remediating hazardous waste sites,
29
courts have criticized CERCLA since its inception due to its
"ambiguous" and "miasmatic provisions." 30  For example,
following its enactment in 1980, the courts grappled with the
liability standard under the statute since Congress specificall, left
it up to the courts to determine CERCLA's liability scheme.3 The
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 9605. The original NCP was prepared and published
pursuant to Section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("Clean
Water Act"). 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d) (2000) (providing that "the National
Contingency Plan shall provide for efficient, coordinated, and effective action to
minimize damage from oil and hazardous substance discharges, including
containment, dispersal, and removal of oil and hazardous substances... "); see
also 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 (1998) which establishes the National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan.
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (a) (8) (B) (providing that "the President shall list as
part of the plan national priorities among the known releases or threatened
releases throughout the United States.").
25 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1980) amended by H.R. REP. No. 99-253 (I) at
74 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835 (The Superfund Amendments
Reauthorization Act of 1986 extended in October, 1990, to September 30, 1994
[hereinafter SARA]).
26 EPA, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Descriptions of 14
Proposed Sites and 7 Final Sites Added to the National Priorities List in May
2000, Intermittent Bulletin, Volume 3, Number 2 (May 2000).
27 id.
28 PUB. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (providing that CERCLA was
enacted "to provide for liability, compensation, cleanup and emergency response
for hazardous substances released into the environment and the cleanup of
inactive hazardous waste disposal sites...").29 See generally 1997 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ANNUAL REPORT.
30 Commander Oil Corp., 215 F.3d at 326.
31 The only reference to a standard of liability is provided in the definitional
section of CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (32) (providing that "liability under
508 [Vol 17
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courts eventually agreed that liability under Section 107 should be
strict, joint and several, to ensure expeditious remediation of
hazardous waste sites.
32
Subsequently, the courts were faced with the task of
discerning whether persons held jointly and severally liable under
the statute had a right to contribution from other co-defendants,
since a contribution provision was not included in the statute as
originally enacted.33 Again, the courts reached agreement that the
this title ... shall be construed to be the standard of liability which obtains under
section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [33 U.S.C. § 1321]").
Philip Cummings, who was chief counsel of the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee at the time of CERCLA's enactment, explains that this was
the final compromise reached prior to the Senate passage of CERCLA:
The committee staff had argued that strict, joint, and several
liability, explicitly referred to in § 1480 and the November 18
substitute was not radical but was the standard of liability
under § 311 of the CWA. Alan Simpson (R-Wyoming) was
skeptical: if that were so, he countered, why not just say that.
The committee staff agreed to put in the reference to the
standard of liability under § 311 that is now § 101(32) of
CERCLA. [Cummings, Completing the Circle, ENVTL.
FORUM 11, 15 (Nov.-Dec. 1990 )].
Percival, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, Law, Science, and Policy (2d Ed.)
(1996).
32 See supra notes 12-13.
33 The original CERCLA legislation created only the cost recovery mechanism
of § 107, which made PRPs "liable for (A) all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by [government entities] .. . ; [and] (B) any other necessary
costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national
contingency plan." 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607 (a) (4) (A) and (B); see Sun Co. v.
Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1190 (10th Cir. 1997) (explaining that
"CERCLA, as originally enacted, left a PRP who was singled out as a defendant
in a cost recovery action without any means of apportioning costs to other PRPs
who may have contributed much of the waste."); see also Colorado v.
ASARCO, Inc. 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486 (D. Col. 1985) (explaining that "[t]o
date, the liability issue most litigated under § 107 has been whether CERCLA
provides for joint and several liability"); Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, 616 F.
Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mo. 1985); United States v. Ward, 1984 U.S.Dist. LEXIS
16774, *9-* 11, 14 E.L.R. 20804 (E.D.N.C. 1984); United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844-45 (W.D. Mo. 1984);
United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256-57 (S.D. Ill.
2001
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statute permitted a right of contribution among co-defendants.
Congress eventually confirmed the courts' conclusions on this
issue by establishing a right of contribution as part of the SARA
amendments with the addition of Section 113(f). 4
The courts took the contribution issue one step further by
limiting private PRPs to Section 113 contribution actions, rather
than 3permitting them to obtain full cost-recovery under Section
107. This determination did not resolve the PRP plaintiff issue in
its entirety since federal courts declined to apply similar limitations
to federal PRPs. Before reviewing these determinations, this article
will proceed with an evaluation of the Section 107 and Section 113
causes of action, demonstrating that the hurdles encountered by the
Section 113, private PRP plaintiffs are significant, and not merely
procedural.
III. SECTION 107 v. 113 - SIGNFICANT DIFFERENCES
A. Persons Liable
Section 107 lists "persons" liable under the statute.36 These
"persons" are more commonly referred to as potentially
responsible parties or "PRPs". They include: (1) the owner and
operator of a facility; (2) any person who owned or operated a
facility at the time of the discharge; (3) any person who arranged
for disposal of hazardous wastes at a facility; and (4) any person
who transported hazardous waste to a facility. 37  The
1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1337-38 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 807 n.3 (S.D. Ohio 1983);
Smith, A Right to Contribution in Superfund Cost-Recovery Actions, 8 CHEM. &
RAD. WASTE LITIG. REP. 41, 52-3 (1984).
14 42 U.S.C § 9613 (f). See also H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 18-19 (1985),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3041 (Section 113 "clarifies the
availability of judicial review regarding contribution claims"); S. REP. No. 99-
11, at 43 (1985) (bill "clarifies and confirms existing law" by adding
contribution provision).
-5 See supra note 16. See also Karl Tilleman & Shane Swindle, Closing the
Book on CERCLA Section 107 "Joint and Several" Claims By Liable Private
Parties, 18 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 159 (1999).
36 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607 (a) (1) - (4).
37 Id. This section was initially utilized by the federal government to recover
response costs from PRPs. Presently, this section is available to private
[Vol 17
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aforementioned parties are similarly liable for contribution under
Section 113. 38  This is virtually the only similarity between the
two sections. The following discussion demonstrates how these
sections differ greatly with respect to liability imposed, burdens of
proof, affirmative defenses, and allocation of orphan shares, with
the greater burden placed on Section 113 plaintiffs.
B. Liability and Related Burdens
To prove aprimafacie case under Section 107, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant falls within one of the
four categories of PRPs; (2) hazardous 39 substances were disposed
of at the facility; (3) there was a release or threat of release of
hazardous substances into the environment; and (4) the release
caused "response costs" to be incurred.4 ° Once a prima facie case
is proven under this Section, the PRP defendants are strictly,
jointly, and severally liable.41 Hence, the successful, Section 107
plaintiff may recover the entire costs of remediation from any
"innocent" parties as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 101 (35). Section 101 (35) permits
an innocent purchaser of contaminated property to assert the third-party defense
of Section 107 (b) (3) if it can establish that: (1) it did not have actual or
constructive knowledge of the presence of hazardous substances at the time the
land was acquired; (2) it is a government entity acquiring the property through
involuntary transfer; or (3) it acquired the land by inheritance or bequest. 42
U.S.C. § 101 (35).
38 See supra note 44.
39 Hazardous substances are defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (14).
40 See supra note 23. In order to establish their prima facie case, private parties
have the additional burden of establishing that response costs were incurred and
that those costs were consistent with the NCP. See United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258-59 (3d Cir. 1992).
41 See supra notes 12-13. Expeditious recovery of response costs incurred by
the government was the primary purpose of CERCLA. Although CERCLA did
not mandate the imposition of joint and several liability, courts permitted it
under principles of tort law that where two or more persons acting independently
cause a single harm, they are jointly and severally liable. See United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert denied 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
For an in-depth discussion of joint and several liability in governmental cost
recovery actions under CERCLA see John M. Hyson, Fairness and Joint and
Several Liability in Government Cost Recovery Actions under CERCLA, 21
HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 137 (1997).
2001
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defendant without having to prove the extent of the defendant's
liability. 2
After the Section 107 plaintiff sucessfully proves its prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the defendants to establish that joint
and several liability under Section 107 should be avoided because
the harm is divisible and damages may be reasonably
apportioned.43  This affirmative defense, while conceptuallyV
available, is, as a practical matter, nearly impossible to prove.
Essentially, a Section 107 plaintiff need only prove a prima facie
case to recover the entire cost of remedation.
42 District and Circuit courts have also held that private PRPs who are
"innocent" may maintain a Section 107 action to "recoup the whole of their
expenditures" from jointly and severally liable defendants. See Rumpke of
Indian, Inc. v. Cummings Engine Co., Inc., 107 F.3d 1235, 1239-42 (7th Cir.
1997); see also Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1303; Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at
1513 (stating that "when one liable party sues another liable party under
CERCLA, the action is not a cost recovery action under § 107 (a). Rather, it is a
claim for contribution under § 113 (f)"); United Technologies v. Browning-
Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 1994) (explaining that "it is sensible to
assume that Congress intended only innocent parties - not parties who were
themselves liable - to be permitted to recoup the whole of their expenditures.");
Akzo Coatings, Inc., 30 F.3d at 764; Boyce v. Bumb, 944 F. Supp. 807, 812
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (realizing that "[p]laintiffs may maintain a § 9607 (a) claim for
full cost recovery to the extent that they can prove themselves to be "innocent
landowners" within the meaning of § 9601 (35) and § 9607 (b)").
43 See County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1515 n.11 (10th Cir.
1991) (quoting U.S. v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171 "Liability under CERCLA
may not be joint and several however, where the harm is divisible."). See also
Dent v. Beazer Materials & Services, 156 F.3d 523, 529 (4th Cir. 1998);
Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 348 (6th
Cir. 1998); OHM Remediation Services v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 116 F.3d
1574, 1579 (5th Cir. 1997); Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1513; United States v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that
apportionment under Section 107 may be warranted where defendant can prove
divisibility of harm).
44 See Centerior Serv. Co., 153 F.3d at 348 (explaining that "[g]iven the nature
of hazardous waste disposal, rarely if ever will a PRP be able to demonstrate
divisibility of harm, and therefore joint and several liability is in the norm.").
But see In re Bell Petroleum Services, Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1993)
(defendant successfully proved harm was divisible and escaped joint and several
liability).4 5 Acushnet Co. v. Mohasco Corp., 191 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 1999).
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By contrast, the Section 113 plaintiff recovers severally (as
opposed to jointly and severally) from each defendant.46  Under
Section 113, the burden does not shift to the defendants to establish
divisibility of harm. Instead, the Section 113 plaintiff has the
added burden of establishing the defendants' pro rata share of
47liabilty relative to its own.
C. Available Defenses and Limitations ofActions
Sections 107 and Section 113 also differ greatly with
respect to available defenses. Section 107 defendants are limited
to asserting the specific defenses listed in Section 107(b). 48 This
section exempts from liability defendants who can establish that
the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, and
damages resulting therefrom, were caused by: (1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war; (3) an act or omission of a third party; (4) or any
combination of the aforementioned defenses.49 No other defense is
available to Section 107 defendants. Since Section 107 defendants
rarely prevail upon these defenses, the Section 107 plaintiff is very
likely to recover its entire share of response costs after establishing
its prima facie case.
Unlike Section 107, Section 113 defendants are not limited
by defenses enumerated in the statute. Rather, equitable defenses
may also be considered. Section 113 expressly permits the courts
to "allocate response costs among liable parties using such
46 Centerior Serv. Co., 153 F.3d at 348; but see Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Ter
Maat 195 F.3d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that "CERCLA does not
preclude imposition of joint as distinct from several liability" in a Section 113
action).
47 Minyard Enters Co., Inc. v. Southeastern Chem. & Solvent Co., 184 F.3d 373,
385 (4th Cir. 1999) (explaining that "plaintiff bears the burden of proving that
defendant is a responsible party under § 107 (a) of CERCLA, and also the burden
of proving the defendant's equitable share of costs"). Cf., Pneumo Abex Corp.
v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d 769, 776 n.4 (4th Cir. )
(holding that a Section 113 plaintiff need not demonstrate that the harm is
divisible, he need only present equitable considerations to guide the allocation of
liability), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 963 (1998).
41 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607 (b)(1) - (4).
49 id.
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equitable factors50 as the courts determine are appropriate.",51 In
determining the defendants' equitable shares of liability in a
Section 113 action, courts may consider, inter alia: the amount of
waste involved; the extent of the parties' involvement; and the
extent of the parties' cooperation with governmental agencies -
which cumulatively diminish the Section 113 plaintiff's recovery.
In addition, a Section 113 plaintiff must commence its
action within three (3) years of the judgment date or entry of cost-
recovery settlement. A Section 107 plaintiff has six (6) years after
the initiation of the remedial action to file its claim.
52
D. Orphan Shares
50 Such factors include the "Gore factors" named after an unsuccessful
amendment to CERCLA proposed by then-Congressman Al Gore. The six
factors are:
a. the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their
contribution to a discharge, release or disposal of a hazardous
waste can be distinguished;
b. the amount of the hazardous waste involved;
c. the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation,
transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous
waste;
d. the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
e. the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to
the hazardous waste concerned, taking into account the
characteristics of such hazardous waste; and
f. the degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal,
State, or local officials to prevent any harm to the public
health or the environment.
51 42 U.S.C. 9613 (f). See also Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 207 F.3d 1177,
1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel, 100 F.3d
792, 802 (10th Cir. 1996) quoting FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d
842, 846 (10' h Cir. 1993) (noting that "[t]he district court has considerable
discretion in apportioning equitable shares of response costs" in a Section 113
action); Westfarm Associates Ltd. Partnership v. International Fabricare Inst.,
846 F. Supp. 422, 433-34 (D.C. Md. 1993) (noting that "in actions for
contribution under CERCLA [the] court has broad discretion to apply a wide
variety of factors in order to reach an equitable resolution," and "may consider
traditional equitable defenses such as caveat emptor, estoppel, laches, or unclean
hands," however "in a CERCLA context these doctrines are not defenses to
liability but are merely factors for the court to consider.").
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (g)(2) & (3) respectively.
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Finally, Section 107 plaintiffs are exempt from
participating in the allocation of orphan shares. These are shares
of recovery costs attributable to PRPs who either are insolvent or
cannot be identified.53 Defendants found jointly and severally
liable under Section 107, are typically left with the additional
burden of allocating orphan shares and paying response costs
attributable to insolvent or unidentifiable PRPs. By contrast, in a
Section 113 action, costs attributable to insolvent or unidentifiable
parties are shared between the Section 113 plaintiff and the
defendants.
54
E. A Substantive Difference
As set forth above, the difference between a Section 107
indemnification action and a Section 113 contribution action is
substantive; not merely procedural. Thus, the federal PRP plaintiff,
permitted to proceed under Section 107, reaps significant benefits.
The federal PRP is fully indemnified for its response costs merely
after establishing its primafacie case55. Thereafter, the jointly and
severally liable defendants are left litigating their shares of
liability, and the allocation of orphan shares.
In contrast, the private PRP, limited to Section 113, must
establish its prima facie case, assess the defendants' share of
responsibility, address numerous equitable considerations - which
cumulatively diminish the defendants' liability and consequently,
the plaintiffs recovery - commence its claim within a shorter
statute of limitations, and absorb some portion of the outstanding
orphan shares, before recovering monies expended in remediation.
53 Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1303. For a general discussion of different
approaches to orphan share allocation see White & Kezbom, "The Debate Over
Orphan Share Allocation," 34 CHEMICAL WASTE REPORTER 3, (Aug. 1997) and
White & Kezbom, "No Need to Redefine Orphan Shares," 34 CHEMICAL WASTE
REPORTER 391, (Nov. 1997).
54 Id. But see Gould, Inc. v. A&M Battery and Tire Service, 901 F. Supp. 906,
908 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that defendant PRPs could not be responsible for
any orphan shares and that plaintiff was responsible for the entire amount),
vacated by Gould, Inc. v. A&M Battery and Tire Svce., 232 F.3d 162, 172 (3d
Cir. 2000).
55 See supra note 30.
2001 515
13
LeVerrier: CERCLA
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2001
TOURO LAW REVIEW
IV. LIMITING PRIVATE PRPs TO SECTION 113
ACTIONS - THE CIRCUITS' RATIONALE
A. Enactment and Judicial Interpretation
In 1980, when CERCLA was enacted, it was unclear
whether a person found jointly and severally liable under Section
107 could obtain contribution for that portion of its expenditures
which exceeded its fair share of responsibility from other co-
defendants.56 Courts took the initiative, as they did in establishing
liability of a plaintiff under CERCLA, and implied an action for
contribution under Section 107. 57 In 1986, the SARA added
Section 113 which created a statutory right to obtain contribution
from co-defendants.
58
B. Section 113 and its Application
The judicial debates that ensued following the enactment of
Section 113 essentially consisted of two schools of thought
amongst federal courts. The first was that private PRP plaintiffs
should be permitted to recover jointly and severally from other
PRP defendants. Those courts reasoned that if private PRPs could
anticipate full recovery of remediation costs, they would be more
likely to volunteer to remediate the site.
The second school of thought (adopted by the majority of
the circuits) was that Section 113 was the vehicle by which
56 See supra note 33.
57 In Walls v. Waste Resource Group, 761 F.2d 311 (6 th Cir. 1985), Judge
Merritt noted that the district courts "have been virtually unanimous" in holding
that Section 107 (a) (4) (B) created a private right of action for the recovery of
response costs. Id. at 318.
"' See H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt.3, at 18-19 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3041 (noting that section 113 "clarifies the availability of
judicial review regarding contribution claims"); S.REP. No. 99-11, at 43 (1985)
(stating that the bill "clarifies and confirms existing law" with the addition of a
contribution provision); see also United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris
Industries, Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 100-01(1st Cir. 1994) (citing SARA's legislative
history indicating that Section 113 was added to confirm a right of jointly and
severally liable defendants to assert contribution claims against co-defendants).
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plaintiff PRPs could obtain cost-recovery from defendant PRPs,5 9
while Section 107 was exclusively available to innocent private
parties, and non-PRP governmental entities.
60
C. The Restatement and Its Applicability to Private PRP
Contribution Actions
The Restatement Second of Torts was extremely influential
to the circuit courts comprising the second school of thought.61
The Restatement explains that joint and several liability evolved to
enable innocent parties to obtain complete recovery for
expenditures resulting from damages caused by one of several joint
tortfeasors where the harm is indivisible. 62  By contrast,
contribution actions developed to enable the tortfeasor, who fully
indemnified the innocent plaintiff, to recover that portion of
liability in excess of its fair share from its fellow joint tortfeasors. 63
Accordingly, the majority of circuits have held that the appropriate
cause of action for a private PRP/joint tortfeasor against its fellow
tortfeasors is a contribution action -- precisely the remedy provided
under Section 113. 64
V. DISTRICT COURTS - REJECTING THE
CONTRIBUTION RATIONALE
A. Overview
'9 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (f). See supra note 16.
60 See supra note 16; but see United Technologies v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33
F.3d 96, 99 n.8 (1st Cir. 1994) (suggesting that "a PRP who initiates a clean-up
without government prodding" might be permitted to bring a Section 107 cost
recovery action), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183 (1995).
61 See, e.g., Acushnet Co. v. Mohasco Corp., 191 F.3d 69, 77 (1st Cir. 1999)
embracing the Restatement (Second) of Torts in construing [CERCLA]).
2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B comment d (1979) ("As
between the proved tortfeasor who has clearly caused some harm and the
entirely innocent plaintiff, any hardship due to lack of evidence as to the extent
of the harm caused should fall upon the former") (emphasis added).
63 See, e.g., In Re Bell Petroleum Services, Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 895-96 (5th Cir.
1993) (extensively citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
" 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (f). See supra note 16. •
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In United States v. Hunter, a California District Court
permitted the United States Government, a PRP plaintiff, to
proceed under Section 107 regardless of its potential liability under
the statute. 65 To achieve this result, the District Court rejected the
fundamental principles set forth in the Restatement Second of
Torts and consistently applied by the majority of circuit courts
evaluating PRP plaintiffs: including the ninth circuit in Pinal
Creek. 66 This is ironic since the United States in Pinal Creek
submitted amicus curiae briefs67 asserting that the private PRP
plaintiffs should be limited to Section 113 actions.
The District Court not only rejected fundamental common
law tort analysis, but also relied instead on outdated precedent,
ambiguous legislative history, and questionable economic theory.
B. Section 113's Ambiguous Legislative History
District Courts which have held that federal PRPs may
recover fully from jointly and severally liable defendants share a
common line of reasoning. They generally begin their decisions
by reiterating a small portion of the legislative history of the
SARA.68 The oft-cited legislative history is as follows:
65 See Hunter 70 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (proceeding as though the
United States, an alleged arranger, was a PRP).66 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1997).
67 See Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d (United States filing as amicus). See also Akzo
Coatings, Inc., 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994) (U.S. filing as amicus); Amoco Oil
Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 665 (5th Cir. 1989) (United States as amicus
curiae); see also Karl Tilleman & Shane Swindle, Closing the Book on CERCLA
Section 107 "Joint and Several" Claims by Liable Private Parties, 18 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 159, 160 (noting that "[tjhe United States appeared as amicus curiae
in Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp. and several other private party
CERCLA actions and argued for a contribution - only remedy").
68 Hunter, 70 F. Supp.2d at 1106 (relying upon Section 113' legislative history
although the United States was an alleged "arranger" of hazardous waste at the
site. See also Town of Wallkill v. Tesa Tape, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 955, 961
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the Town of Wallkill, former operator of the
Town of Wallkill municipal landfill may proceed under Section 107 since the
legislative history of SARA amendments demonstrates that liability may be
fixed first under Section 107); see also United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp.
397, 414 (D.N.J. 1991) ("[T]he legislative history of the Superfund
Amendments of 1986 makes clear that the United States may bring either a
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This section [113] does not affect the right of the
United States to maintain a cause of action for cost
recovery under Section 107 or injunctive relief
under Section 106, whether or not the United States
was an owner or operator of a facility or a
generator of waste at the site. Where the United
States has been required to pay response costs as a
generator or facility owner or operator, the United
States may maintain an action to recover such costs
from other responsible parties.
69
This passage is inadequate to justify unequal access to Section 107
for several reasons. First, the legislative history of CERCLA, as a
whole, is conspicuous in its lack of precision and clarity.70
Second, this passage in particular is unpersuasive because it
omits mention of federal arrangers and transporters: two explicit
categories of PRPs in the statute.7' The folly in relying on this
passage despite these glaring omissions is evident in Hunter,72
where the District Court in California quoted the passage in
support of its decision to permit the United States, an alleged
arranger,73 to proceed under Section 107.
Third, nothing in the express language of the statute
indicates an intent to allow non-"innocent" federal parties, alone
Section 106 or Section 107 action, regardless of whether the United States itself
was a generator of waste at the site").
69 See H.R. REP. No. 99-235 (I) at 79-80 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861-62 (emphasis supplied).
70 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir.
1985) (stating that "CERCLA's history reveals as much about the nature of the
legislative process as about the nature of the legislation...."); see also
Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equipment, 215 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 2000)
(referring to CERCLA's "disjointed legislative history"). See also supra note
21.
71 See supra notes 6 & 7 respectively.
72 70 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
73 Id. at 1102 ("Because section 107(a) imposes liability on even those parties
that merely arrange for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances, 42 U.S.C.
§9607(a)(3), and it appears that several agencies contracted to have waste
delivered to the site, the court will proceed as though the United States, through
its various agencies, is a PRP").
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amongst all PRPs, to reap the advantages of Section 107 over
Section 113. Indeed, CERCLA expressly includes the federal
government it its definition of "persons" liable under the statute.74
Had Congress intended to exempt the federal government from the
equitable considerations of Section 113, it could have, and should
have, done so as part of the SARA Amendments. Congress's
failure to do so evinces an intent to maintain the status quo, and
treat federal PRPs substantively and procedurally similarly to non-
federal PRPs.
Fourth, there is no preferential treatment of federal PRPs -
as opposed to other PRPs - with regard to their initial liability to
plaintiffs under Section 107. On the contrary, it is well- settled
that a federal owner, operator, generator, arranger, or transporter
of hazardous waste to a facility, is liable to the same extent as a
non-federal entity under Section 107 .
74 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (21) ("[T]he term 'person' means... United States
government, State, municipality..."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9620 ("Each
department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States (including the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government) shall be subject to,
and comply with, this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both
procedurally and substantively, as any non-governmental entity, including
liability under section 9607 of this title.").
75 See FMC Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 840-44 (3rd Cir.
1994) (holding that the federal government was liable as an operator under
Section 107(a) where the government had substantial control over a high-
tenacity rayon production facility and had active involvement in the activities
there.); United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1444 (E.D.
Cal. 1995) (holding that where the federal government's regulatory or remedial
activities, of whatever nature, bring the activity within the definition of the terms
owner, operator, arranger or transporter, as those terms are applied to private
parties, the government will be liable); Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.
v. Peck Iron & Metal Co. 814 F. Supp. 1281, 1285 (E.D. Va. 1993) (noting that
CERCLA intends to hold the federal government liable to the same extent as
non-governmental entities under Section 107); United States v. Stringfellow,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19001, *15-*16, 20 ELR 20656 (C.D. Cal. 1990)
(holding that the state of California was clearly a generator for the purposes of
CERCLA since the state had arranged for disposal and treatment of hazardous
substances at a site after it had been closed by its landowner.); United States v.
Freeman, 680 F. Supp. 73, 74-75 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding state liable as
operator through its agents where, through its agents, the state secured the site
with a barrier and posted signs, declaring the site to be a crime scene, and the
agents opened various drums and due to failure to close them properly, allowed
some of their contents to escape. But see, Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck,
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C. The "Public Monies" Rationale
Another argument shared by District Courts which permit
federal PRPs toproceed under Section 107 is the "public monies"
rationalization. An example of this rationale is found in the New
Jersey District Court's decision in United States v. Kramer.
77
The district court in Kramer (which preceded Hunter s)
permitted the United States government, an alleged transporter79 of
wastes, to proceed under Section 107. It reasoned, inter alia, that
"reimbursing the government .for its entire response costs in a
Section 107 action -- whatever its own liability as a PRP -- serves
the important public policy of maintaining Superfund reserves for
response costs at other sites."
80
This reasoning ignores the fact that Superfund reserves are
"preserved" each year by taxing crude oil imports, petroleum
imports, and "certain uses or exports."'" In fact, 78% of the
Inc., 935 F. Supp. 805, 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that the state thruway
authority was not a PRP where it had no obligation to exercise control over
disposal of hazardous substances emanating from vehicles travelling along
thruway and did not have active involvement in disposing of any hazardous
substance); United States v. Skipper, 781 F. Supp. 1106, 1112 (E.D.N.C. 1991)
(holding that the United States Coast Guard had not, through its regulatory
activity subjected itself to liability under Section 107).
76 See United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 414 (D.N.J. 1991) ("[T]he
brute fact is that the government and not the named defendants has spent public
monies on the clean up, and is therefore entitled to full recovery of those monies
whatever its potential liability for contribution."); see also Hunter, 70 F. Supp.
2d at 1108 (noting the EPA's responsibility for enforcing CERCLA and
recovering response costs to protect the public fisc).
77 757 F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1991).
78 70 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
79 "Transporter" is another category of PRP explicity omitted from the portion
of legislative history relied on by certain courts to allow access to Section 107
by federal PRPs. Perhaps the Kramer court realized the folly in trying to rely on
a passage which omitted the very category of PRP before it and, thus resorted to
a policy-based rationale.
80 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1000 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
81 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611 (d) (1) - (3) (listing persons liable for [Hazardous
Subtance Superfund] tax). This statute establishes the Oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund.
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Hazardous Waste Trust Fund comes from chemical, petroleum,
and corporate taxes.82
D. The District Courts Impede Judicial Economy
The District Courts attempt to rationlize their ill-founded
preferential treatment of federal PRPs by rationalizing that co-
defendants may, at some point in the future, commence a Section
113 action against federal PRPs for contribution.83 This rationale,
however, begs the question of whether it is fair, or efficient, to
create a two-step process for co-defendants defending themselves
against governmental PRPs as opposed to a one-step process
against private PRPs.
The first step ignores any liability on the part of federal
PRPs and permits them to recover, jointly and severally, from their
fellow PRPs. The second step forces them to re-litigate the issue of
liability, which could have been easily addressed during the first
stage of the litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In CERCLA proceedings, where a federal PRP is liable for
response costs, it should be required to apportion its share of the
responsibility simultaneously with other PRPs in a Section 113
action. The statute does not distinguish between federal and other
PRPs and a poorly written excerpt from the legislative history
should not be used to override the clear Congressional intent to
treat all PRPs equally. Nor should it be used to contravene
82 See supra note 20. See also EPA 540-K-96/004 Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response, EPA Superfund Today, Focus on Cleanup Costs (June
1996) ("78% of the Superfund Trust Fund has come from chemical, petroleum,
and corporate taxes.").
83 Hunter, 70 F. Supp. at 1107; see also Town of Wallkill v. Tesa Tape, 891 F.
Supp. 955, 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[L]iability may be fixed first and immediately
for enforcement purposes, and litigation later to determine what contribution is
owed and by whom as a result of the remediation effort."); Kramer, 757 F.
Supp. at 416 ("Any PRP is entitled under Section 113 to bring a contribution
action against other PRPs-- including the PRP who previously cleaned up the
mess and was paid for its trouble through a Section 107 proceeding -- to
apportion costs equitably among all the PRPs").
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common law principles of indemnification and contribution firmly
ingrained in tort jurisprudence - and applicable to private and
federal PRPs.
Furthermore, preferential treatment of federal PRPs is not
needed to maintain Superfund reserves. The purported economic
benefit gained from such treatment is outweighed by indirect costs
arising from both the diminished deterrence against federal
pollution and the inevitable decline in environmental concern by a
private sector justifiably frustrated by big brother's favorable
treatment.
For the foregoing reasons, federal PRPs should be limited
to Section 113 contribution actions. In holding otherwise, certain
federal courts have created a distinction between federal and other
PRPs which contradicts CERCLA's express provisions and
underlying policies.
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